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Abstract 
 
Past literature has claimed that knowledge systems 
can enhance or facilitate the creation, retention, 
transfer and application of tacit knowledge. While this 
paper agrees that this objective is realizable, it argues 
that the literature has so far failed to successfully 
operationalize this, since at the core of the models 
published to date lies the flawed epistemological 
assumption of knowledge ‘conversion’ – more 
specifically, tacit to explicit knowledge conversion.  
This paper proposes the alternative epistemology of 
agential realism which allows us to reframe tacit 
knowledge within knowledge systems, whereby humans 
and machine are coupled together (intra-act) to 
enhance and retain tacit knowledge creation and 
sharing without putting undue emphasis on its 
conversion and storability into an explicit form – thus, 
agential realism allows tacit to remain as tacit. In 
addition, this critical-conceptual paper proposes 
nascent examples of human-machine or knowledge 
system configurations which have affinities or potential 
affinities with an agential realist approach.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Past literature has acknowledged the importance of 
tacit knowledge, whereby it has often been associated 
to expert know-how and ‘deep smarts’ [1, 2, 3, 4]. For 
example, Collins [3] refers to a specific aspect of high 
level expert knowledge which he coins as collective (or 
deep) tacit knowledge residing within social groups 
(and more specifically, communities of practice). Such 
knowledge goes beyond knowledge of past situations 
in that it involves flawless improvisation to address 
current situations at hand. Attaining such knowledge 
involves social embedding or social immersion in the 
specific social settings of the communities of practice 
in question. Examples range from the more taken-for-
granted bike-riding in traffic [5] to dynamic and 
knowledge intensive examples such as multi-
disciplinary surgery teams dealing with non-typical 
situations [6, 7]. Along similar lines, Leonard and 
Swap [4] argue that deep knowledge (or "deep smarts") 
which certain experts possess, that is something 
experts are especially good at after many years of 
experience, involves significant levels of tacit 
knowledge in the form of know-how and know-who 
which cannot be easily documented because of its 
highly contextual nature as well as in its difficulty to 
fully explicate. Here, the authors refer to the ability to 
reason swiftly without much conscious effort yet able 
to identify trends and anomalies which would escape 
the notice of less experienced individuals. When asked 
to explain a specific decision, "experts often cannot re-
create all the pathways their brains checked out and so 
cannot give a carefully reasoned answer" [4, p. 6].  
Despite the non-representational character of such 
knowledge, it has been argued that various knowledge 
system technologies and techniques can enhance or 
facilitate the creation, retention, transfer and 
application of tacit knowledge [8, 9, 10]. More 
specifically, it is viewed that information and 
communication technologies (ICT) such as e-learning 
technologies and techniques can help transform or 
convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge [9]. In 
a more global fashion, Selamat and Choudrie [8] 
propose an Information Systems (IS) framework to 
convert and codify tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge. Along similar lines, Alavi and Leidner [10] 
had proposed a 4-step framework of knowledge 
creation, storage, transfer and application. In all cases, 
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s [11] knowledge creation 
model is referred to in regards to converting tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge.  
While this paper agrees that knowledge systems 
can most certainly enhance or facilitate the creation, 
retention, transfer and application of tacit knowledge 
residing within individuals and groups, we argue that 
current approaches may be flawed in two inter-
connected manners:  
 
1. The assumption that embodied tacit knowledge 
can be retained via its ‘conversion’ to explicit 
knowledge and subsequently stored in traditional 
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manners, such as documentation and codification 
is highly questionable. 
 
2. The lack of understanding of what indeed we are 
trying to retain, transfer and apply when we refer 
to tacit knowledge. 
     
Inspiring ourselves with the work of various 
authors, including Collins [3], Tsoukas [12] and Carter 
et al [13], we will first present our position as to what 
tacit knowledge is and is not, and as such, argue that 
deep high-level tacit knowledge cannot be ‘converted’ 
and dissected into language or code, but at best only 
partially explicated in terms of equivalent (yet not 
identical to tacit) descriptions. We will then propose an 
approach based on Karen Barad’s [14] onto-
epistemology of agential realism, which we argue is 
more in line with the view of the deep, highly 
inextricable, distributive and hard to explicate nature of 
collective tacit knowledge residing within communities 
of practice. Across this alternative lens we also briefly 
propose possible ways forward that can constructively 
couple humans and machines (or information and 
communication technologies) and thus allow for the 
sharing and transfer of tacit knowledge within a more 
non-dichotomous human-machine knowledge system.  
 
2. Understanding tacit knowledge  
 
Polanyi first introduced the terms tacit knowledge 
and tacit knowing in his work on Personal Knowledge 
[15]. For Polanyi [15], tacit knowledge cannot be 
adequately articulated by verbal means which he later 
summarized as "we know more than we can tell" [16, 
p. 4]. Yet, in-line with Polanyi, Tsoukas [12, p. 424-
425] states:  
The ineffability of tacit knowledge does not mean 
that we cannot discuss the skilled performances in 
which we are involved…provided we stop insisting on 
“converting” tacit knowledge and, instead, start 
recursively drawing our attention to how we draw each 
other’s attention to things... We can command a clearer 
view of our tasks at hand if we “remind” ourselves of 
how we do things so that distinctions which we had 
previously not noticed, and features which had 
previously escaped our attention, may be brought 
forward…we do not so much need to operationalise 
tacit knowledge as to find new ways of talking, fresh 
forms of interacting, and novel ways of distinguishing 
and connecting. Tacit knowledge cannot be “captured”, 
“translated”, or “converted” but only displayed, 
manifested, in what we do. New knowledge comes 
about not when the tacit becomes explicit, but when 
our skilled performance – our praxis - is punctuated in 
new ways through social interaction".  
For Polanyi, “all knowing…is personal knowing – 
participation through indwelling” [17, p. 44] which 
involves skillful action and a “personal coefficient” 
[18, p. 17]. Furthermore, “the aim of a skilful 
performance is achieved by the observance of a set of 
rules which are not known as such to the person 
following them” [18, p. 49]. Or as Tsoukas [12, p. 414] 
explains, "a cyclist, for example, does not normally 
know the rule that keeps her balance, nor does a 
swimmer know what keeps him afloat. Interestingly, 
such ignorance is hardly detrimental to their effective 
carrying out of their respective tasks". 
In Polanyi’s theory [18] tacit and explicit 
knowledge are related to two types of awareness, 
namely, subsidiary awareness and focal awareness 
respectively. For example, in using a hammer to drive 
a nail, driving the nail down is the focal object of 
attention. At the same time, one is also aware of 
subsidiary feelings in the palm of holding the hammer. 
Hence, the focal object is always identifiable and in 
this sense explicit, whereas the subsidiary content is 
unidentifiable or tacit [17]. Furthermore, the two kinds 
of awareness are mutually exclusive [18, p. 56]; that is, 
when the attention is switched to something hitherto 
subsidiary, it becomes focal losing its subsidiary 
meaning ([19]; [12]). As Tsoukas [12, p. 415] points 
out, "if a pianist shifts her attention from the piece she 
is playing to how she moves her fingers…or if a 
carpenter shifts his attention from hitting the nail to 
holding the hammer, they will all be confused…In the 
context of carrying out a specific task, we come to 
know a set of particulars without being able to identify 
them, [hence] Polanyi’s [16, p. 4] memorable phrase, 
“we can know more than we can tell”".  
Polanyi explains how in the act of acquiring more 
knowledge (i.e. knowing), the shrinking of 
consciousness of certain things is, in the context of 
action, accompanied with the expansion of 
consciousness of other things. “This lapse into 
unconsciousness”, remarks Polanyi [18, p. 62], “is 
accompanied by a newly acquired consciousness of the 
experiences in question, on the operational plane… it is 
a structural change achieved by a repeated mental 
effort aiming at the instrumentalization of certain 
things and actions in the service of some purpose”. 
Polanyi gives the example of a medical student 
learning X-ray diagnosis of pulmonary diseases. 
Initially: “he can see in the X-ray picture of a chest 
only the shadows of the heart and the ribs...The experts 
seem to be romancing about figments of their 
imagination; he can see nothing that they are talking 
about” [18, p. 101]. Eventually however, “he will 
gradually forget about the ribs and begin to see the 
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lungs. And eventually, if he perseveres intelligently, a 
rich panorama of significant details will be revealed to 
him: of physiological variations and pathological 
changes…He has entered a new world” [18, p. 101]. 
As Tsoukas [12, p. 418] summarizes, "knowledge has, 
therefore, a recursive form: given a certain context, we 
blackbox – assimilate, interiorise, instrumentalise – 
certain things in order to concentrate, focus on others". 
Nonaka and Takeuchi ([11] p. 61), who were 
instrumental in popularizing the concept of tacit 
knowledge in management studies during the 1990’s, 
aptly describe tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge 
as inseparable from one another: “tacit knowledge and 
explicit knowledge are not totally separate but 
mutually complementary entities”. This is in line with 
Polanyi’s ([16], p. 195) own words “all knowledge is 
either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge”. Yet as 
previously explained, they are also mutually exclusive 
[18]. These two important points of inseparable yet 
mutually exclusive entities, would seem to be 
paraphrased across Nonaka, Toyama and Konno’s 
([20], p.8) words of “explicit knowledge without tacit 
insight quickly loses its meaning”. Later literature by 
Nonaka et al ([21], [22]) especially stress the 
inseparable aspect of tacit and explicit knowledge: 
“tacit and explicit should not be treated as separate 
entities but rather mutually complementary and based 
on the same continuum” ([22], p. 640). The latest 
literature by Nonaka et al ([23]), again re-illustrates the 
inseparable aspect of tacit and explicit qualities across 
organizational ‘fractals’ consisting of triads of tacit and 
explicit knowing (with its synthesis forming the third 
‘pole’).         
 
2.1. Can it be converted to explicit knowledge? 
 
Past literature has highlighted the debate on tacit 
knowledge and its relationship with explicit 
knowledge. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi [11],  
knowledge is created and expanded through social 
interaction between tacit knowledge and explicit, 
whereby “the explanation of how Japanese companies 
create new knowledge boils down to the conversion of 
tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge” [11, p. 12]. 
Along these lines, “for tacit knowledge to be 
communicated and shared within the organization, it 
has to be converted into words or numbers that anyone 
can understand. It is precisely during this time that 
conversion takes place—from tacit to explicit, and, as 
we shall see, back again into tacit—that organizational 
knowledge is created” [1, p. 9)]. 
Numerous authors have objected with this view [3. 
4, 12, 13]. For example, Carter et al [13, p. 62] state 
“short of a brain transplant, the capacity to know [(tacit 
knowledge)] is not a transferable commodity”. 
Virtanen’s [19] pertinent analysis of tacit knowledge 
argues that while Nonaka et al’s ([21], [22]) 
description of a knowledge continuum ranging from 
‘almost’ wholly explicit knowledge at one end to 
‘almost’ fully tacit knowledge on the other end, offers 
a useful analogy depicting both the inseparable 
qualities and changing degrees of tacit and explicit 
knowledge, the concept of ‘knowledge conversion’ of 
tacit to explicit when going along this continuum 
becomes highly problematic in terms of what indeed is 
meant and how this is interpreted. Beyond Nonaka et 
al’s ([21], p. 19) attempt to clarify by stating that “the 
term ‘conversion’ might be misunderstood as implying 
that knowledge is a substance that can be processed in 
the way as physical resources”, one is left without 
much else. Virtanen ([19], p. 122) goes on to argue that 
the conversion of tacit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge according to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
concept (and as as understood by various other authors 
such as Hall and Andriani, [24], etc.) involves going 
from personal beliefs to an objective ideal of 
knowledge which “Polanyi wanted to criticize with the 
concept of tacit knowledge”.         
Tsoukas [12, p. 424] points to a similar issue – 
namely, on whether tacit knowledge can in fact be 
partially or wholly reduced into articulable language or 
code, given enough time and effort: "Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s interpretation of tacit knowledge as 
knowledge not-yet-articulated – knowledge awaiting 
for its “translation” or “conversion” into explicit 
knowledge –, an interpretation that has been widely 
adopted in management studies, is erroneous: it ignores 
the essential ineffability of tacit knowledge, thus 
reducing it to what can be articulated". In a similar 
fashion, Collins [3, p. 3], argues “Nonaka and 
Takeuchi describe the way the previously tacit 
knowledge associated with kneading dough for bread 
was elicited and formulated so that it could be 
reproduced in mechanical form in a bread-making 
machine…They think the notion of tacit knowledge is 
exhausted by knowledge that just happens not to have 
been explicated but could be given a bit more effort”. 
More cogently, and similarly argued by Virtanen [19] 
"the conduit metaphor of communication that underlies 
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s perspective – the view of ideas 
as objects which can be extracted from people and 
transmitted to others over a conduit – reduces practical 
knowledge to technical knowledge…To treat practical 
(or tacit) knowledge as having a precisely definable 
content, which is initially located in the head of the 
practitioner and then ‘translated’” [11, p. 105] into 
explicit knowledge, is to reduce what is known to what 
is articulable, thus impoverishing the notion of 
practical knowledge. As Oakeshott [25, p. 15] remarks, 
“a pianist acquires artistry as well as technique…" [12, 
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p. 421-422]. This latter point, overlaps onto a second 
key issue, namely on knowledge involving subjective 
or personal interpretations: “Nonaka and Takeuchi 
suggest that the unique can become ‘universal’…In 
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, explicit knowledge is 
portrayed as a language of fixed meanings. But neither 
‘apple’, nor any other word, can account for its own 
interpretation: what a word means cannot be separated 
from the way in which it is interpreted, which is always 
subjective” [26, p. 173 and 175]. 
It should be noted that a later portrayal by Nonaka 
et al ([23], p. 3 and 4) of the organization in terms of 
‘fractals’ of knowledge triads (tacit knowledge, explicit 
knowledge and its synthesis leading to ‘practical 
wisdom’) across the firm, still does not preclude the 
questionable notion of conversion if we read words 
such as “when an individual’s tacit knowledge is 
shared with another person it becomes explicit 
knowledge, and when this is merged with other explicit 
knowledge it becomes new explicit knowledge, which 
in turn can then be converted into the tacit knowledge 
of an(other or the same) individual” and “In cases like 
the Toyota Prius, it is clearly shown that tacit 
knowledge is shared and converted into explicit 
knowledge”. 
The next two short sub-sections attempt to further 
argue that: 
 
1. Knowledge involves personal constructions, 
thus reminding us that any explication of tacit 
knowledge is at best a personal and subjective 
endeavor.    
 
2. Tacit knowledge cannot be wholly reduced 
into explicit knowledge, and furthermore, what is 
actually rendered explicit does not always have 
anything to do with what is actually embodied in the 
bearer. 
 
2.1.1. Knowledge as personal construction. 
Glasersfeld [27] as well as Ray and Clegg’s [26] non-
representational view of knowledge construction, 
begins with Polanyi’s own position on knowing “… 
the capacity to know is personal. Knowledge (no 
matter how ‘knowledge’ is defined) is in the heads of 
persons and the knowing subject has no alternative 
other than to construct what he or she knows using his 
or her experience” [26 citing 22, p. 1]. Glasersfeld [27] 
directly addresses the representational claim of 
observer objectivity by first explaining, across Jean 
Piaget's work on cognitive development, how human 
mental operations lead up towards a mental/subjective 
construction of reality.  These operations involve both 
the construction of action and symbolic schemes (the 
latter as interpretive semantics) leading towards 
sensorimotor and conceptual knowledge, respectively 
[27, p. 76].  Each of these schemes is constructed based 
on unique personal experiences, which may be similar, 
but never identical to, another person's constructions 
[27, p. 158]."  The point here is that humans learn by 
constructing a viable picture of reality; and that we 
may on occasion 'bump' into our external reality across 
"failures" [27, p. 156]. This rejoins Weick's [28] theory 
of individual and organizational sensemaking, which 
seeks plausibility as opposed to what is true in the 
absolute sense. As Glasersfeld [27, p. 156] adds, "the 
idea of correspondence with reality is replaced with the 
idea of fit.  Knowledge is good knowledge if it fits 
within the constraints of experiential reality and does 
not collide with them.  This fit…has to remain viable 
in the face of new experience or experiments, but also 
in that they prove compatible with other schemes and 
theories one is using". 
 
2.1.2. Collins’ Weak, Medium and Strong Tacit 
Knowledge. Collins [3] explains that tacit knowledge 
can be divided into three forms: relational, somatic and 
collective – which can also be thought of as weak, 
medium and strong tacit knowledge. On the one hand 
relational ‘tacit’ knowledge can (with some effort) “be 
rendered explicit”, while at the other extremity, 
collective tacit knowledge is impossible to fully 
explicate in that “we know of no way to describe it” [3, 
p. 11] – but said another way: certain ‘weak’ 
dimensions of tacit knowledge can be partially 
explicated. Yet, the term ‘explication’ should not be 
misconstrued as ‘conversion’. 
      The first type being relational or weak tacit 
knowledge “has to do with the relations between 
people that arise out of the nature of social life. As 
Collins [3, p. 11] explains, “a characteristic of weak 
tacit knowledge is that, in principle, with enough 
effort, any piece of it could be rendered explicit”. 
Relational tacit knowledge is that which occurs 
between the professor of kinetics and his physics 
students.  What has become evident for the professor 
requires an effort of explicitation for the junior physics 
students. 
      The second category is what Collins [3, p. 11] calls 
somatic or medium tacit knowledge “that is knowledge 
that is tacit because of the way it is inscribed in the 
material of body and brain”. Somatic tacit knowledge 
is learned progressively and is put in practice in a more 
or less conscious manner. It is a “knowledge that can 
be written out but cannot be used by humans because 
of the limits of their bodies”. Bicycle riding/balancing, 
typing or playing the piano at a highly proficient level, 
etc. all fall within this category, whereby the 
knowledge required can be fully explicated, but only as 
an “expressed scientific understanding of causal 
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sequences...and in principle, if not in practice, these 
can be understood scientifically...how we might go 
about it though remains technically beyond our 
[body/brain] capacities” [3, p. 117]. It is often 
represented by the emblematic case of the case of the 
artisan baker or breadmaker as described by Nonaka 
[11] that subsequently became world famous at about 
the same time that bread-making machines (domestic, 
etc.) were being developed and diffused. 
      And finally, there is the strong or collective tacit 
knowledge “that the individual can acquire only by 
being embedded in society. This is called “strong”, 
because we know of no way to [fully] describe it or to 
make machines...even mimic it. Strong tacit knowledge 
is a property of society rather than the individual” [3, 
p. 11]. Hence, the individual can learn the practices 
and language only across a certain degree of social 
engagement. Collective tacit knowledge resides within 
the collectivity, for example that which is formed by 
urban Chinese, Parisians or Londoners. This location 
can seem paradoxical at first glance, yet less so when 
we allow for the role of language. Its transmission 
from one source of generation to another is 
simultaneously a transmission of knowledge. Riding a 
bicycle within a specific agglomeration is not just a 
question of maintaining one’s balance on two wheels, 
but also to understand a set of signs and situations 
validated by a socialisation process which passes by 
the mediation of language [3]. Collins [3] also 
associates this type of knowledge with high level 
specialised knowledge within a community of practice 
whereby language and practice can only be fully 
understood by an outsider via practice and immersion. 
 
3. The incommensurability of embodied 
action-oriented tacit knowledge with 
explicit knowledge 
 
From the previous section it can be argued that 
codifying and/or documenting tacit knowledge 
becomes a problematic, if not impossible, endeavor. 
Four issues come to mind:  
 
a. Knowledge possessed and carried out by experts 
in the form of tacit knowledge cannot be fully 
expressed as language or code  
 
b. Certain aspects can indeed be explicated in the 
form of code or language may have little to do 
with the original tacit knowledge in question (ex. 
equations used as an equivalent, yet not identical, 
form of knowledge to explain the act of riding a 
bicycle [29])  
 
c. Knowledge as expressed by individuals or groups 
involves an endless process of re-construction and 
interpretation [27, 28]. 
 
d. High level collective tacit knowledge within 
groups or communities of practice is distributive 
in nature – that is, no one individual can possess it 
all [2, 3].        
 
These four issues bring forth two inter-related 
challenges which have a direct impact on the ability, 
and thus validity, of capturing such tacit knowledge 
across mere documentation and/or codification: 1) the 
clearly flawed assumption of knowledge 
‘convertability’, and 2) the lack of appropriate 
understanding as to the nature of the knowledge in 
question that we are trying to capture when we refer to 
tacit knowledge. 
The highly embodied nature of both collective and 
somatic tacit knowledge cannot be fully extracted (if at 
all) by a simple act of disembodiment. Several 
arguments to support this position have already been 
put forward in the previous sections, yet perhaps one 
that should be further highlighted is that by Tsoukas 
[12] when examining the difference between explicit 
and tacit knowledge. Contrary to explicit knowledge, 
the highly personal indwelling and contextualized 
nature of tacit knowledge renders its reversibility (via 
reproducibility and standardization) impossible [12]. 
Towards this argument is a first reminder of how 
knowledge is embodied: "insofar as our contact with 
the world necessarily involves our somatic equipment 
– “the trained delicacy of eye, ear, and touch” [17, p. 
31] - we are engaged in the art of establishing a 
correspondence between the explicit formulations of 
our formal representations (be they maps, scientific 
laws or organizational rules) and the actual experience 
of our senses" [12, p. 413-414]. Tsoukas [12, p. 415-
416] uses Polanyi’s subsidiary and focal awareness to 
explain how the irreversible nature of tacit knowledge 
cannot be reduced into explicit knowledge (and 
therefore reversible form) across explanatory 
articulations unless we strip all meaningful situational 
elements and actions: "tacit knowledge forms a 
triangle, at the three corners of which are the 
subsidiary particulars, the focal target, and the knower 
who links the two … No knowledge is possible without 
the integration of the subsidiaries to the focal target by 
a person. However, unlike explicit inference, such 
integration is essentially tacit and irreversible…its 
irreversible character can be seen if juxtaposed to 
explicit (deductive) inference…When, for example, 
you examine a legal syllogism or a mathematical proof 
you proceed orderly from the premises…to the 
conclusions. You lose nothing and you recover nothing 
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– there is complete reversibility…Such reversibility is 
not, however, possible with tacit integration. Shifting 
attention to subsidiary particulars entails the loss of the 
skillful engagement with the activity at hand. By 
focussing on a subsidiary constituent of skilful action 
one changes the character of the activity one is 
involved with." [12, p. 415-416]. 
 
3.1. Addressing embodied knowledge across 
agential realism 
 
The embodied nature of tacit knowledge brings 
forth two important features: that of integration within 
the body and that of action. The notion of embodied 
knowledge is in fact derived from the phenomenology 
of  Merleau-Ponty [30, p. 144]: 
 
To know how to touch type is not, then, to know the place of 
each letter among the keys, nor even to have acquired a 
conditioned reflex for each one, which is set in motion by the 
letter as it comes before our eye. If habit is neither a form of 
knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is 
knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when 
bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in 
detachment from that effort. 
 
Merleau-Ponty also explains that in experiences of 
bodies in situations it is impossible to disentangle so 
called ‘natural’ and ‘social’ elements: “everything is 
both manufactured and natural in man, as it were, in 
the sense that there is not a word, not a form of 
behaviour which does not owe something to purely 
biological being—and which at the same time does not 
elude the simplicity of animal life” [30, p. 189]. 
The natural and the social is again taken up by 
Latour’s [31] non-dualist philosophy of hybridized 
categories within his concept of actor-network theory. 
The ideas of Latour and Merleau-Ponty in terms of the 
non-dual relationship between the natural and the 
manufactured, as well as the human and the non-
human, has been more recently reflected within the 
performativity concept of socio-materiality “there is no 
social that is not also material, and no material that is 
not also social” [32, p. 29]. Yet, at the base of 
Orlikowski’s socio-materiality lies a more detailed and 
exhaustive epistemology (or onto-epistemology) which 
more fully defines and describes the role and 
importance of phenomenon within everyday reality, 
based on the work of Karen Barad [14], known as  
agential realism. Influential in the development of 
agential realism was Niels Bohr, a quantum physicist 
who asserted that observing apparatuses are not merely 
passive instruments, but things that participate in the 
formulation of scientific observation, thus challenging 
the separateness of observer and object. According to 
Barad, reality is viewed as a collection of phenomena 
involving the intra-action between agencies of 
observation and 'objects' (where both involve shifting 
boundaries or 'cuts'). Barad [14, p.  104] identifies 
phenomena as the smallest unit for this intra-action and 
thus the building blocks for reality, which “is not 
composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-
phenomena, but things-in-phenomena.” Phenomena 
represent the inseparability of an object and 
observations of it. It also connotes a dynamic quality, 
and thus, in combination with agency, implies action, 
or more specifically, intra-action. Central, then, to 
Karen Barad’s [14, p. 49] proposal of a sociomaterial, 
performative understanding of scientific practices, is 
“that knowing does not come from standing at a 
distance and representing but rather from a direct 
material engagement with the world”. As Barad [14, p. 
157] points out, “...we do not see merely with our eyes. 
Interacting with (or rather, intra-acting ‘with’ and as a 
part of) the world is part and parcel of seeing. Objects 
are not already there; they emerge through specific 
practices”. Humans too are constituted through 
relations of materiality — bodies, clothes, food, 
devices, tools, which, again, are produced through 
human practices. "Whereas the construct of interaction 
suggests two entities, given in advance, that come 
together and engage in some kind of exchange, intra-
action underscores the sense in which subjects and 
objects emerge through their encounters with each 
other" (cited in [33, p.267]). And it is in this sense that 
our ‘seeing’ things, ‘hearing’ things, ‘making sense’ 
and ‘talking of’ things, are all material practices, 
involving the intra-twining, or the entanglement, of 
certain of our material bodily processes with those of 
the material world. This entanglement of specific 
material reconfigurings she refers to as apparatuses.  
Apparatuses in themselves can involve both human 
and non-human bodily arrangements, which shift and 
intra-act with one another as phenomena. Apparatuses 
are 'material-discursive' in that they produce meanings 
and material beings while simultaneously excluding 
the production of others. Boundaries or cuts within the 
apparatus According to Barad, the deeply connected 
way that everything is entangled with everything else 
means that any act of observation makes a "cut" 
between what is included and excluded from what is 
being considered. This cut is a subjective act which 
depends on context, points of views and apparatus 
configurations at hand. Thus, throughout the 
complexity of enactment and agency, boundaries or 
cuts are not given but constructed [14]. Cuts or 
boundaries remain temporary and are dependent on the 
situation at hand. For example, Goodwin [34, p. 20] 
speaks of the "symbiotic" relationship between 
gestures and their objects, whereby the gesture's 
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objects are integral components of the gesture itself. 
On the other hand, the actor is also integrally part of 
the gesture. It becomes somewhat tricky to define the 
clear cut boundaries between the bodies involved in the 
gesturing. The integral whole (of gesture, actor and 
object) becomes more easily understood as a 
phenomenon. Another example of the shifting nature 
of boundaries or cuts can be found in Suchman’s [33, 
p. 263-264] description of technology intensive 
medicine, whereby the transitions of patient anaesthetic 
states is described, "Over the course of an anaesthesia, 
agency involved in the maintenance of vital bodily 
functions are progressively delegated from the patient 
as an autonomously embodied entity to an intricately 
interconnected sociomaterial assemblage and then back 
again".  
 
3.2. Why Agential Realism? 
  
Agential realism offers the opportunity for 
individuals (or groups) who possess and act out 
embodied tacit knowledge to continue to do so in the 
presence of communication and information 
technology, which in turn, act as enhancers of tacit 
knowledge creation and sharing within the groups or 
individuals in question. Tacit knowledge remains tacit 
without attempting to be fully articulated and thus 
avoids the perilous undertaking of disembodiment. 
This implies that the body of the bearer must somehow 
accompany and not be dissociated from the technology 
in question. That is not to say that the technology 
cannot carry some of the tacit knowledge in the form 
of explication. But there will always be a bodily 
component that cannot be fully explicated and can 
therefore only be shared with others across intra-
actions with the body of the bearer. This comes back to 
Collins [3] and Tsoukas [12] argument of immersion 
with the individual or group in question – which the 
addition of non-human objects in the form of 
technology, thus forming an apparatus made up of 
individuals (or a group) coupled with technology, 
which in turn, produces the phenomena of tacit 
knowledge creation and sharing across intra-actions. 
Embodied knowledge is now embodied within the total 
apparatus as opposed to purely human delineations – 
whereby technology becomes an extension of humans 
thus producing a blurred boundary between humans 
and technology, and whereby cuts or boundary to be 
made depend on context, interpretation and 
configurations at hand. In a sense, we are now looking 
at cyborgs as opposed to separate human and non-
human entities. This is exactly what Lucy Suchman 
[33] in her work on Human-Machine Reconfigurations 
proposes.  
Underpinning Suchman’s work is agential realism, 
whereby she speaks of shifting boundaries which 
depend on context, points of views and human-
machine configurations (or apparatuses) at hand. 
Suchman [33] describes technology intensive 
medicine, involving the transitions of patient 
anaesthetic states as an example of intra-action 
occurring between humans and machines. We do not 
have to go to into the realm of sci-fi to find other 
examples of cyborgs (ex. mechanical shovel operators, 
airline pilots, individuals with limb prosthesis, etc.). 
Duguid [35, p. 5] explains how Suchman showed 
that communication between a user and the machine 
was not, as Xerox "designers assumed, between two 
comparable intelligences. Ordinary conversation, 
ethnomethodologists had showed, with its efficient use 
of linguistic indexicals, its suggestive silences and 
gestures, its rituals of turn taking, its reliance on 
contextual resources, and its open-ended trajectory, 
was extraordinarily complex. In contrast, the idea of 
“interaction” and “intelligence” embedded (but not 
embodied) in the machines were remarkably 
impoverished". Suchman drew a distinction between 
devices built to execute preordained plans with 
accuracy and efficiency, and humans who use plans in 
context and improvisation as one among many guides 
to action. As Duguid [35, p. 5] argues, "this 
reconceptualization of the plan presented a profound 
challenge to the assumptions of AI, Cognitive Science, 
and Human-Computer Interaction". Of importance, 
Suchman’s [33] work argues that as pre-ordained plans 
are rigid but context ever changing, intuition, 
improvisation and interpretation in work are essential 
rather than unnecessary for deploying a plan. Also re-
echoing Collin’s [3] and Tsoukas [12] incessant 
warnings on the limits and dangers of trying to 
completely explicitize tacit knowledge, Duguid [35, p. 
7] adds, “implicit assumptions cannot all be made 
explicit...Practical understanding is more fundamental 
than detached theoretical understanding ... We do not 
relate to things through having representations of 
them...Meaning is fundamentally social, and cannot be 
reduced to the meaning-giving activity of individual 
subjects...I cannot imagine Suchman disagreeing with 
any…also…through Suchman, Heidegger has provided 
central tools for the critique of AI and Cognitive 
Science and the general understanding of human-
machine interaction and communication".  
 
3.3. A few words on critical realism 
 
Before discussing past and current examples of 
human-machine configurations which are (or are 
potentially) in line with an agential realist approach, a 
few words should be given to a current companion 
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approach that is attracting more attention within the 
study of information systems – namely, critical 
realism. In critical realism, structures and interactions 
are two objects of study that mutually shape and 
inform each other, but that can nonetheless be 
analytically separated in time [36]. In a recent analysis 
of agential realism made by both Mutch [37] and 
Leonardi [38], agential realism’s break with the 
dichotomy established by social constructivism and 
naïve realism, both of which retain commitments to 
separatism and representationalism, is seen as being 
problematic for studying “the combinations of the 
social and the material” [47, p. 2 and 11], or of 
examining the “nature” of “material properties” [32, p. 
22]. More precisely, agential realism’s presumptions of 
non-separability or entanglement (for example, 
between action and structure considered as being one 
in the form of action alone) and non-essentialism 
(“indeterminacy”) make it unsuitable to studying the 
“impacts” of technology or how technology “inscribes” 
aspects of social structure [37, p. 22]. Both Mutch [37] 
and Leonardi [38] use this argument to indicate the 
contrasting strength of critical realism in this regard, 
whereby action and structure (in a manner similar to 
Gidden’s structuration theory) are considered as 
separate or dual entities and as such allows for the 
opportunity to analyse both structure (which, in 
borrowing from Cook and Brown [2] is explicit or 
known) and the role of action (which borrowing from 
both Polanyi as well as Cook and Brown [2] in terms 
of ‘knowing’, is predominantly tacit in nature) and how 
they imbricate one another [38, p. 73]. In answering 
this critique, Scott and Orlikowski [39, p. 77-80], argue 
"Precisely! Agential realism is not useful here. Its 
ontology is explicitly opposed to viewing the social 
and material as separate, and assuming that properties 
and boundaries are inherent. In precluding 
considerations of separate entities, their combinations, 
and their inherent properties, agential realism is doing 
its job…this is not a weakness of agential realism but 
its strength. By providing an ontological position and 
theoretical apparatus for examining entanglement and 
enactment, agential realism offers conceptual and 
analytical traction for making sense of the world and 
its possibilities in new ways… Barad’s move toward 
performative alternatives to representationalism shifts 
the focus from questions of correspondence between 
descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or 
culture?) to matters of practices, doings, and actions. 
Practices from this perspective are not tasks undertaken 
by people in roles, but material-discursive practices 
enacted through apparatus that simultaneously 
constitute and organize phenomena… When Mutch 
does discuss Barad’s work (pp. 15-16), it is to offer an 
outline of a few of her concepts and then criticize them 
for inadequately dealing with two ideas that are central 
to critical realism: emergence and stratification, and 
structure and agency (ibid. p. 12). He then finds — not 
surprisingly given his starting point — that agential 
realism does not offer the same resources for 
addressing these issues as does critical realism. In 
developing agential realism, Barad’s agenda has never 
been to offer a blueprint for “how to carry out concrete 
social analysis” (ibid. p. 16). Berating agential realism 
for supplying “a shaky foundation” to social science 
(ibid. p. 17) is simply misplaced. Suggesting as much 
is akin to censuring critical realism for offering a shaky 
foundation to geological analysis". 
While this paper acknowledges that inseparability 
between structure and action can indeed pose a 
problem when dealing with the generation and sharing 
of explicit knowledge and explicit information, we 
consider agential realism to be a more valid approach 
when considering the irreducible, embodied and action 
oriented nature of expert tacit knowledge being 
produced and shared between individuals within a 
group (or between groups) in the presence of 
technology. To distill this tacit knowledge into an 
explicit form which can stand alone within technology 
is a fruitless endeavor. Yet technology and humans 
intra-acting together, we argue may not only maintain 
tacit knowledge within the group or work environment, 
but may further enhance its creation and sharing, 
whereby technology becomes an extension of the 
human senses and bodily movements either in a real or 
a virtual sense (ex. simulators). 
 
3.4. Possible knowledge system configurations? 
 
       One possible configuration already at work which 
appears to have affinities with the agential realist 
approach is in freestyle chess, whereby drawing 
inspiration from Cowen’s [40] book Average is Over, 
freestyle chess players have adopted the centaur 
approach. Rather than half-horse, half-human, a 
centaur chess player is one who plays the game by 
marrying human intuition, improvisation and creativity 
with a computer’s brute-force ability to remember and 
calculate a staggering number of chess moves, 
countermoves and outcomes. Teaming the two in 
chess, experts say, produces a force that plays better 
chess than either humans or computers can manage on 
their own. 
        Of particular interest are current socio-technical 
expert systems in the health care sector being 
developed which have evolutive capabilities [41]. 
Current configurations seem to be more in line with a 
critical realist stance, whereby users may be able to 
contact experts within a community of practice (for 
example, an expert neuro-surgeon  within a group, yet 
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tacit knowledge may be lost because of the emphasis 
on transferring knowledge from one expert to another 
practitioner across explication alone. The challenge 
here would be on the one hand transmit highly 
contextual body knowledge (for example, a complex 
surgical maneuver), across all modes of senses and 
body movements in question – would a mere film 
suffice? Exposure across different forms of virtual 
reproduction? Exposure across remote displacement to 
the contextual site in question? While we do not 
pretend to have a complete and one-size-fits-all 
solution, we argue that technologies which can help 
trigger bodily senses across real or simulated 
situatedness (and not just verbal or codified articulation 
alone), could potentially allow collective tacit 
knowledge to be shared via imitation and learning by 
doing. This being said, in line with Leonardi [38], and 
more specifically stated by Scott and Orlikowski [39, 
p. 77-80], "one of the more welcome developments in 
the field [of information systems] over the past decades 
has been the plurality of theoretical and 
methodological approaches used…We see no reason 
why critical realism and agential realism cannot work 
alongside each other, exploring information systems 
and organizations phenomena through shared 
commitments to subtle realism — joining in 
conversation". 
 
4. Conclusions  
      
Past literature has claimed that knowledge systems 
can enhance or facilitate the creation, retention, 
transfer and application of tacit knowledge. While this 
paper agrees that this objective is indeed realizable, it 
argues that the literature has so far failed to 
successfully operationalize this, since at the core of 
their models lies the flawed epistemological 
assumption of knowledge ‘conversion’ – or more 
specifically, tacit to explicit knowledge conversion. 
This, in turn, manifests itself in the problematic effort 
of “capturing”, “translating” and “converting” tacit 
knowledge into storable explicit knowledge. This paper 
has attempted to show that the often misunderstood 
contextual, personal, subjective, and embodied nature 
of tacit knowledge within individuals and groups (i.e. 
distributive) renders it problematic (if not impossible) 
to wholly reduce into an explicit form. 
The alternative epistemology of agential realism is 
proposed which allows us to reframe tacit knowledge 
within knowledge systems, whereby humans and 
machine are coupled together (or intra-act) to enhance 
and retain tacit knowledge creation and sharing without 
putting undue emphasis on its conversion and 
storability into an explicit form – thus, tacit is allowed 
to ‘live and let live’ in such a configuration. While 
words and code can help, they can never fully explicate 
or address the inherent ineffability of tacit knowledge, 
for to try to do so is to ‘kill it’ or make it disappear. 
This critical-conceptual paper proposes a few 
nascent examples of human-machine or knowledge 
system configurations which have affinities or 
potential affinities with an agential realist approach. 
We realize that such examples are highly suggestive 
and lack adequate empirical justification, but hope that 
such an approach can serve as a basis for further 
debate. The authors intend to conduct empirical studies 
within identified knowledge systems that resemble 
agential realist configurations. 
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